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W.: Criminal law--Self Defense--Defense of Another
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERILY

778, 69 S. E. 936 says, "The suppression or concealment of material
facts known to the applicant is a fraud upon the company, and
avoids the policy." Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 79..
It is not the purpose of this article to advocate applying the
harsh rule of marine insurance to life insurance, nor is its object
that of denying to the insured any rights which he justly deserves.
The desire is to point out that the insurer, even with his opportunity for examination and right of questioning, may fail to obtain
the very information which would, if discovered, keep him from entering the contract. When such information is possessed by the
applicant, and can be reasonably said to be regarded by him as a
material fact, a failure to reveal this fact should not result in a
reward to the insured.
-J. G. J. Jr.

CRIMINAL LAW--SELF DEFENSE-DEFENSE OF ANOTHER-D was

convicted of an unlawful assault on P. He admits the assault, but
pleads defense of his father. Evidence showed that D shot P in
defense of his (D's) father, who was at the time engaged in an
affray with P. Evidence also showed that D's father was at fault in
bringing on the affray, and that D apparently knew this. Held,
D was justified in shooting P in defense of his father, regardless
of the question of whether the father had or had not been at fault
in bringing on the affray between himself and P. State v. Jas.
Wisman, 94 W. Va. 224, 118 S. E. 139 (1923).
Such a decision seems a substantial extension of the law of self
defense and would seem to justify a son in doing more in defense
of his father than the father could do in his own defense. It is
well settled law that whatever one may do in his own defense, a
relative may do in his behalf, Stanley v. Commonwealth, 86 Ky. 440,
6 S. W. 155, 13 R. C. L. 837, but the right of a person to take life
in defense of another is recognized by the law only when such
other would be entitled to kill in his own defense, State v. Cook,
78 S. C. 253, 59 S. E. 862, 13 R. C. L. 838, and the one interfering
acts at his peril if it turns out that the person defended had forfeited his right of self defense. 13 R. C. L. 838. It is submitted
that the father here had, by bringing on the affray with P, forfeited his right of self defense until he had retreated and withdrawn from the fight. What one may do in defense of himself when
threatened with death, he may also do in defense of a brother,
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but if the brother was at fault in provoking an affray, he must
retreat as far as he safely can before his brother would be justified
in taking the life of an assailant in his defense. State v. Greer,
22 W. Va. 802. See also Clarke v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 360,
18 S. E. 440; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 845, 36 S. E. 487;
State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 680. The right of one person to defend
another is co-extensive with the right of that other to defend
himself, and the one who defends is upon no higher plane than
the one defended. If the one defended is not free from fault in
bringing on the difficulty, his defender cannot be. Weaver v. State,
1 Ala. App. 48, 55 So. 956; Wheatley v. State, 93 Ark. 409, 125
S. W. 414; Wheat v. Commonwealth, 118 S. W. 264 (Ky. 1909).
Thus it seems that a son acting in the defense of his father occupies
exactly the position that the father would occupy in his own
defense, that the son can do no more than could be done by the
father, and in case of an affray a retreat is necessary before taking
an adversary's life in self defense. State v. Hood, 63 W. Va. 182,
59 S. E. 971; State v. Hatfield, 48 W. Va. 562, 37 S. E. 623. In
repelling an assault upon a member of his family, one is entitled
to the same defense as if he had been the person assaulted, but to
no other or greater defenses. Wood v. State, 128 Ala. 27, 29 So.
557, 30 C. J. 34. So, if a father was at fault in bringing on a
combat, before the son can be excused for an assault in defense of
the father, it must appear that the father had abandoned or offered
to abandon the combat. State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 481; State v.
Johnson, 75 N. C. 174; Pierson v. State, 23 Texas 579. It would
seem then that the principal case stands practically alone in its
holding, and that it is not supported by authority in this or in
other jurisdictions of this country. The rule seems an unwarranted
extension of the law of self-defense, and one capable of working
injustice on society in general.
-J. H. W.
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